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Transitions to Permanent Employment.
The Potential of Administrative Data
A. COLI, E. FABBRI, B. PACINI, M. SYLOS LABINI
Active labor market policies (ALMPs) are meant to help the unemployed
and the economically disadvantaged to find a job. They usually include
a combination of job search assistance, training and wage subsidies. In
the last decades, few public policies have received such in-depth scrutiny
by economists and statisticians and have been evaluated with so many
different empirical strategies (Heckman at al. 1999). Nevertheless, one
of the main insights from this rich literature is that there is substantial
heterogeneity in the impact of ALMPs. Thus, policy makers are often
left without clear guidance on which social groups benefit the most from
these interventions and which types of programs are worthwhile social
investments.
This guidance is particularly important in Italy for at least two reasons.
Firstly, it is one of the advanced countries where investments in ALMPs
are the lowest (Mandrone, 2014). Secondly, recent reforms have tried to
introduce a model of flexicurity combining labor market flexibility (i.e.
lower firing costs) with increased security for workers and not for jobs
(i.e. broader ALMPs). However, while the first pillar of the model has been
implemented, the second one is still work in progress.
This chapter aims at shedding some light on the effectiveness of
existing ALMPs. The maib goal of this contribution is to show how it
is possible to combine three sources of administrative data, namely, the
systemofCompulsoryCommunications (ComunicazioniObbligatorie, CO)
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managed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy; the archives of local
agencies in charge of active labor market policies (PES) and the equivalent
economic/financial status indicator (EESI) data drawn from fiscal assis-
tance centers. Administrative microdata, which only recently have been
released in Italy for research purposes, have the advantage of providing
information almost in real time and to be accurate at local domains. For
our purposes, they allow to trace job transitions to a permanent position,
investigate how workers move across jobs, identify unemployment spells,
program participation and different types of labor contracts. We also
discuss possible identification strategies to assess the effectiveness of
active labor market programs which exploit discontinuity stemming from
labor market reforms. Finally, we use event history analysis to model the
time to exit to a permanent job as a function of individual characteristics,
previous labor experience and participation to programs.
Admittedly, our data have a number of limitations. In the first place,
they refer to the period 2011-2014, which follows the crisis and includes the
Fornero reform (2012) but leaves out the JobsAct approved in 2015. Secondly,
they only relate to the Tuscan province of Pistoia. Hence, this work is still
preliminary and in the final section we highlight some possible directions
for future research.
1 Introduction
Since the 2008 financial crisis, unemployment rates have been persistently
high in most EU countries. Mainly due to its structural weaknesses, Italy
is one of the European States which have been most damaged by the crisis.
The Italian labor market is highly heterogeneous across gender and age
factors with the marginalization of specific subgroups of population, in
particular women and young people. There are also clear disparities across
local labor markets within the country. Moreover, after the introduction
of new temporary contracts at the end of the nineties, there is a strong
dualism between permanent and temporary workers.
A number of labor market measures have been introduced in 2012
(For-nero labor reform), which attempted to reduce both employment
protection for permanent workers and the overuse of the less protected
temporary contracts.
Active labor market policies (ALMPs) are one of the main instruments
to mitigate the effect of the crisis. With the recent Jobs Act (2015), Public
Employment Services (PES), which were previously decentralized to local
governments, are moving back to centralization. A national employment
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agency is now responsible for ALMPs, including its coordination with
social benefit providers. To some extent, this new centralization seems at
odds with a growing demand for place-based policies with a high level of
selectivity (to account for scarcity of resources).
Themain goal of this chapter is to show the potential of administrative
microdata in monitoring the short term evolution of the labor market, at a
very detailed level, and to evaluate the effectiveness of labor policies. With
respect to survey data, administrative data, which have only recently been
released for research, have the advantage of being continuously registered
and of being accurate at local domains. Unfortunately, these data are not
released in workable formats and, to fully exploit their potential and to
provide useful support to policy makers, a number of data editing and
processing procedures need to be established (see, for example, Baldi et al.
2011).
We focus on the 2011-2014 period, which follows the crisis and includes
the Fornero reform (2012) but leaves out the recent Jobs Act reform (2015)1.
Due to data limitations, our analysis is confined to the Tuscan province of
Pistoia.
We exploit three different sources of administrative data: the system
of Compulsory Communications (Comunicazioni Obbligatorie, CO) man-
aged by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies; the archives of local
agencies in charge of active labor market policies (PES); and the equivalent
economic/financial status indicator (EESI) provided by fiscal assistance
centers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt in using EESI
data in conjunction with CO and ALMP datasets.
Our analysis encompasses various steps. As a preliminary descriptive
analysis, we trace job transitions to a permanent position and investigate
how workers move across jobs, experiencing unemployment, program
participation, or different types of labor contracts. We analyze the relation-
ship between types of contracts and individual characteristics (age, gender,
residential place, etc.) to verify whether there are types of contracts, which
are an obstacle to gaining a better and more stable job, looking at specific
segments of population.
An important issue in the ALMPs evaluation literature is the difficulty
in controlling for selection bias, which may lead to either upward or
downward distorsion of results (Bruno et al. 2013; Caliendo and Schmidl,
2015; Card et al. 2010, 2015; Martin, 2014). Most convincing identification
strategies tried to exploit differences in the applicability of ALMPs (for
1For a preliminary assessment of the impact of the 2015 policies, see Sestito and Viviano
(2016).
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example, the eligible age for specific programs), or time-discontinuity due
to the entry into force of a given reform. In this chapter, we use event
history analysis tomodel the time to exit to a permanent job as a functionof
demographic characteristics, previous labor experience and participation
to ALMPs programs. Assuming selection on observables, the program
average effect can be measured by the difference between the exit rate to
a steady job of those who entered a specific program and the exit rate of
those who did not. Moreover, we also provide some preliminary evidence
stemming from the time-discontinuity due to the Fornero labor reform.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2 briefly presents the
administrative data sources; section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of
our dataset with a focus on specific policy measures introduced by the
Italian government in 2012 (Fornero labor Reform). Section 4 presents
some results from a survival model for the time to exit to a permanent job.
Our conclusions are expounded in section 5.
2 Data sources
The database of Compulsory Communications (Comunicazioni Obbligato-
rie, CO), managed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies, includes
information from all the subjects responsible for communicating the start,
the termination or the transformation of a job position. Since 1March 2008,
every employer, in the private and in (part of) the public sector,must use the
CO electronic service to notify any variation in the status of the employees.
Potentially, the CO data set contains a rich set of variables concerning
the employer, the worker and the job position, so that statistical analyses
based on this administrative sourcemight greatly enhance the informative
support to policy making (Baldi et al., 2011). Until recently, most Italian
studies of labor market dynamics were either based on the Italian Labor
Force Survey provided by Istat or on the Work Histories Italian Panel
(WHIP) provided by Laboratorio Riccardo Rivelli. CO data convey impor-
tant and so far under-investigated information on employment dynamics
in Italy (see Chelli andGigliarano, 2012; Anastasia et al., 2016). Furthermore,
CO have both the advantage of being continuously registered and of
guaranteeing the availability of longitudinal microdata.
However, because of the decentralization of the data-collection process
to the regions, the quality of micro data differs quite a lot across different
regions. Our data refer to one province (Pistoia) of the region of Tuscany
and cover the period from January 2011 to December 2014. It is important
to bear in mind that people who were never employed (the unemployed
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or people not in the labor force) or the employed in open-ended contracts
whose status never changed since January 2011, have not been observed.
For the same period, we have acquired micro data from Public Em-
ployment Services (PES), reporting individual characteristics (such as age,
gender, citizenship) and ALMPs actions (date and type of action). The
quality of thedata is heterogeneous, dependingon thepertaining territorial
office and also on the staff member who registered the information.
For these reasons, accurate quality checking and data revision were a
preliminary requirement.
We also have individual data available from ESSI (Equivalent Economic
Situation Indicator) statements coming fromCGILfiscal assistance centers
(the Italian most important workers union) in the province of Pistoia.
Our purpose is to understand whether EESI data are useful in improving
analysis of labormarket dynamics at the local level, and towhat extent EESI
information fits the evidence stemming from other data sources.
The Equivalent Economic Situation Indicatorwas introduced in Italy in
1998 to measure the economic condition of citizens requesting for mean-
test welfare programs which take into account household composition.
Citizens who want to access mean-tested welfare programs are required
to submit a formal statement containing all the necessary data to compute
the EESI. The field of application is extremelywide and heterogeneous and
mainly concerns the provision of services (benefits) for which a principle
of rationing related to the applicants’ economic conditions, applies. Such
data are collected in a database (the EESI database).
Besides its administrative objectives, the EESI database may be used
to analyse the economic conditions of the population at the sub-regional
level, even if EESI data are typically affected by a self-selection bias, in that
only persons eligible for mean-test welfare programs become part of the
database. With respect to tax registers data, the EESI database contains
information pertaining to the economic conditions of both individuals and
households. With respect to a sample survey, the EESI database provides
information on household income and wealth at local level. Further, the
EESI data allows one to focus on populations scarcely covered by sample
surveys (single with children or family with more than two children).
However, the EESI database suffers from the typical flawsof administrative
data (as it is fragmentary and not properly collected). It is reasonable to
expect an improvement in the quality of data starting from the recent EESI
reform (2015; for a preliminary monitoring report see Ministero del lavoro
e delle politiche sociali, 2016).
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3 Descriptive analysis
We present some descriptive statistics based on CO and PES data for the
province of Pistoia in the period 2011-2014. Over this period, our data
include 258,628 communications, involving 92,655 workers (53.5% women
and 46.5% men) and 129,117 ALMPs, administered to 61,332 individuals
(53.1% women and 46.9% men).
Table 1 shows the number of hires and workers by year. The average
turn-over per year is also reported. On average, each worker changes (or
transforms) his/her employment contract almost 3 times during the period,
while the average turn-over per year is about 1.7.
The distribution of ALMPs actions and of beneficiaries by year is
reported in Table 2. The average number of ALMPs actions per person
increased over time, going from 1.4 in 2011 to 1.6 in 2014. It is worth noting
that the per capita number of ALMPs interventions throughout the whole
period was 2.1, therefore higher than annual values, thus suggesting that
a relevant number of individuals tends reiterate their applications for PES
services. This can be explained as a sort of “customer loyalty”, in that less
qualified individuals with low social capital view employment services as
the only way to exit from unemployment/inactivity (see Reyneri, 2005) .
We have classified the different types of contract into four main cate-
gories of interest (open-ended, fixed-term, apprenticeship, Projectwork/Co.
Co. Co.) in addition to a residual one (others). The distribution of hires
by type of contract and gender is presented in Table 3. Percentages of
males and females are roughly balanced by type of contract, with some
appreciable differences with respect to fixed term contracts (4.2% in favour
of women) and open-ended contracts (2.8% in favor of men).
Table 4 illustrates how different contract types are distributed accord-
ing to workers’ age groups. The fixed term contract plays a prominent role
in each age group, ranging from 45.3% for young workers to 60% for the
30-49 age group. However, this does not necessarily lead to a permanent
position. Table 5 displays transition frequencies from one contract to
another (Table 5) andwe can see that only 10.98%of these contracts give rise
to open-ended employment, while most of these workers (56.94%) are re-
employed with fixed-term contracts. When employed in permanent jobs
(19.7%), workers maintain the same job in 63.59% of cases (see censoring
column in Table 5) throughout the observation period, while those who
change jobs aremostlyhiredwith anewopen-ended contract (21.87%). Only
11.35% experiences a downgrade to fixed term contracts. Apprenticeships
(4.4%),whosenatural result is supposed tobe the conversion to apermanent
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job, mostly tend to be renewed by the same or other employers (31.69% and
47.45%, respectively). We can observe transitions to open ended positions
only in 7.71% of our sample.
We are also interested in studying the effects of the Fornero labor mar-
ket reform. To explore whether it had any sizeable impact on job creation,
Figure 3 reports the quarterly number of total hires. If anything, after the
reform, the overall number of jobs which have been created, decreased. Of
course, several additional factors (beyond the reform itself) may explain
this pattern. As mentioned, one of the main goals of the new law was to
encourage the creation of permanent positions. Figure 4 plots the share of
permanent jobs createdduring eachquarter. Contrary to reform intentions,
the share of new permanent positions declined. Again, this pattern may
be due to different factors but constitutes prima facie evidence of the
failure of the reform. An additional objective of the Fornero reform was
to establish the apprenticeship contract as the main route leading to a
permanent contract. Figure 5 depicts the share of apprenticeship contracts
among hires who are 29 or younger (apprenticeship is only legal under this
threshold). Again, it appears that reform implementation fell short of the
government’s expectations. This seems to be confirmed by the pattern of
overall young hires which is remarkably similar to the pattern concerning
older workers (Figure 6).
To measure job quality, we associated a score (on a scale from 1 to 3) to
each type of contract, according to itswage levels, social security protection
and union intensity. From this ranking, we computed a composite index of
the contractual quality for subgroups of females and males (ranging from
0%, minimum contractual quality, to 100%, maximum contractual quality),
which resulted in 49.3% forwomenand 50.7% formenover thewhole period
of observation2. Looking at the time trend of the index, we can observe a
progressive slow decrease in the quality of contracts for females (starting
from 49.8% in 2011 and ending to 47.9 in 2014), while males present a more
varied trend, even if over 50% in most cases (see Figure 1). In Figure 2
the contractual quality index is reported by age subgroups: looking at the
whole period, the index is higher for the 30-49 age group, followed by the
over 50 and youth. Trends for the three age groups appear similar, showing
a progressive quality decrease from 2011 to 2014.
Tables 5 and 6 result from the joint analysis of COB and PES data3.
2The composite index is computedas follows for a set ofnunits:
(
∑n
i=1 wi/3n)−min
max−min ∗100
withwi = 1, 2, 3.
3For the sake of facilitating interpretation, we aggregated some similar typologies of
ALMPs and proposed a classification which accounts for different level of effort required
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Hires after an ALMP action amount to 65,534 (51.2% women and 48.8%
men), which represents 25.3% of total hires observed in the period (equal
to 258,628).
As shown inTable 6 (seeALMPcolumn) subjects accessingPESsusually
take advantage of more than an ALMP action before finding a job, so
that their placement should possibly be attributed to the overall path.
Looking at transition frequencies ALMP-to-ALMP (Table 7) observed ALMP
interventions appear to follow the procedure recommended by European
Union (Bresciani, 2006): Counseling → Training → Stage/Internship →
effective job placement.
As a whole, the key role of counseling clearly emerges, both at the
beginning of the search process and subsequently. After the first coun-
seling intervention, 27.63% of job seekers access to additional counseling.
Moreover, after training activities (both those directly supplied by PESs
and training vouchers), job seekers often go back to counseling (72.69% and
87.89%, respectively).
In the next sections, we investigate whether and to what extent the
process undertaken by job seekers requiring PESs services is related to the
time needed to achieve a god quality position. Individual characteristics,
labor market conditions and policy instruments are likely to explain this
variable.
4 Time to exit to a permanent job
We exploit standard survival analysis tools (also known as event history
analysis or duration modeling) to describe exits into a permanent job,
conditional on a set of covariates (see Blossfeld et al. 2007 for a general
introduction; see Caretta et al. 2013 for a recent application to Italian labor
market). This class of models, even if originally developed in biostatistics,
has been largely applied in a variety of social research fields: labor market
studies, social inequality studies, demographic analyses, educational stud-
ies, political science research, marketing applications, and so on.
Here, a hazard based duration model is applied to the length of time
spent before moving into a high quality job position. The dependent
variable is the number of months (duration) that an individual spends
in low quality employment (or unemployment/out of labor force) before
exiting to the first steady/protected job position. We use the classification
either by the PES operators or by the individuals accessing PES (IRPET, 2014). Both Interviews
exD.lgs 18100, which are conditions to access employment services, and generally unspecified
actions, have been excluded from our analysis.
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introduced in Section 2 to characterize high quality job positions, which
include most (but not all) open-ended contracts. Survivor analysis allows
us to model the length of time spent in a given state before moving
into another state, taking into account the presence of censored and left-
truncated data. Censoring arises because not all the full history of the units
is observed until the event of interest occurs (usually denoted as “failure” in
survival analysis)while left truncationdepends on individuals becoming at
risk or even fail before starting observation.
Let Tj be a continuous random variable, with probability distribution
f(t), representing the lengthof each individual j spell. The survival function
for the j-th individual, or the probability that his spell T is of length at least
equal to t, is given by the following:
S(t) = 1− F (t) = Pr(TJ > t) =
∫ ∞
t
f(s)ds
where F (t) = Pr(Tj ≤ t) =
∫ t
0
f(s)ds is the cumulative distribution
function of T . We also define the hazard rate for individual j at time t as
themarginal probability of achieving apermanent job position, conditional
on not having achieved it before time t:
h(t) = Pr(t < Tj < t+ dt|Tj > t) = f(t)
1− F (t) =
f(t)
s(t)
Within this class of models, we specify the semiparametric Cox propor-
tional hazardmodel (Cox, 1972; 1975), which avoids parametric assumptions
on the hazard function at baseline and assumes a baseline hazard that is
common to all the individuals in the study. In the Cox model, the hazard
for the j-th individual in the data is assumed to be:
h(t|xj) = h0(t) exp(β′xj)
where β′ is the vector of regression coefficients; x a vector of covariates
which influence the hazard rate; and h0(t) is the baseline hazard func-
tion. The effects of covariates can only induce proportional shifts in the
transition rate but cannot change its shape. The Cox model has been
widely used, although the proportionality assumption restricts the range
of possible empirical applications. It can be a useful starting point when
one is mainly interested in the magnitude and direction of the effects of
observed covariates, controlling for time-dependence.
Table 9 reports the empirical survivor functions based on the Kaplan-
Meier non-parametric estimator, showing the shares of subjects who, at
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specific time points after the beginning of observation, are still waiting
for a steady job. Starting from 95%, after about 12 months the probability
of waiting decreases to 0.77% (conversely, the probability of achieving a
permanent position increases to 23%). After 36 month this probability is
equal to 70%.
Table 10 presents the results from a continuous semiparametric Cox
model with baseline constant covariates describing individual character-
istics (age, gender, education level) and time varying covariates including,
for each subject, ALMPs intervention at t − 1 (if any), previous training
experience, type of contract at t − 1, total number of ALMPs actions
until t, total number of job position until t as a proxy of job experience.
We also included a variable representing the Fornero labor reform (with
value 1 from the date of entering into force). The model is estimated
on the integrated dataset resulting from merging COB and ALMPs data
(amounting to 59,623 subjects and 177,978 events, with the exception of
subjects with a single recorded event). Robust standard errors have been
computed, adjusted for clusters of individuals.
We can easily interpret the estimated hazard ratios (reported in the
table instead of coefficients of the linear predictor): a ratio greater than 1
means that the variable positively correlates with the probability to move
to a high quality job position, given that the same position has not been
achieved before; otherwise if the hazard ratio is lower than 1, the variable
contributes to reducing this probability, therefore increasing survival
(waiting for a steady job) time. Our findings show the following results:
age positively correlates with the occurrence of the outcome; women have
apositive significativehazard ratio,which is in linewithprevious literature
stating thatwomenachievefirst stabilizationbeforemen. Both thenumber
of ALMPs actions and previous job positions negatively correlate with
the outcome: these results would suggest that frequent job interruptions
can negatively affect subsequent working life with fewer employment
opportunities (see also Caretta et al., 2013). Moreover, subjects with a high
number of ALMPs actions may correspond to less qualified human capital
which becomes tied to the PES for a longer time. An ALMP action in
the previous spell increases the likelihood of stabilization; while specific
training activities do not appear to significantly affect the obtaining of
a steady position, which, in line with other literature, highlights a lock-
in effect. Looking at different typologies of previous job contracts, we
found a positive effect of fixed-term contracts and a negative effect of both
apprenticeship and project/co.co.co. work, with respect to the set of other
categories. Lastly, the ’Fornero’ labor reform shows an overall significative
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negative effect. Less qualified workers show a positive hazard ratio, while
a negative effect is observed for the high qualified.
We now focus on the reduced sample obtained looking at the subgroup
of subjects also present in the EESI data set. The EESI data set contains
information on 24550 subjects for the period at hand. The merging
processing results in 5658 subjects (thosewho also appear at least one time
in the CO database). It is necessary to bear in mind that this subgroup
represents a self-selected subpopulation where heads of households are
eligible for mean-test welfare programs.
Wemostly consider our simple exercise as a way to highlight potential
advantages of exploiting multiple administrative archives, possibly avail-
able at the local level. For the present, we include the standardised EESI
indicator and personal income as time-varying covariates (referred to the
previous year), as well as the size of the household (number of members)
as a baseline covariate.
Results in Table 11 show that most variables included in the previous
model loss significance, however the standardized EESI indicator appears
to significantly reduce the probability of stabilization at time t, suggest-
ing that the overall household economic situation may convey relevant
information for our analysis. Conversely, we found a positive association
between the probability of stabilization and the level of personal income,
which may act as a measure of the quality of previous job positions with a
probability to be converted in a permanent position.
These results are preliminary, but, in our opinion, worthy of further
investigation. We aim to extend the analysis to draw proper causal infer-
ences. In fact, even if event historymodels are a useful approach to uncover
causal relationships, opportunities for causal inferences depend on the set
of data at hand and on (untestable) assumptions one is available to accept
(Ham and Lalonde, 1996). Causal mechanisms imply a counterfactual
reasoning (Holland, 1986; for a recent book on causal inference see Imbens
and Rubin, 2015). Effectiveness evaluation analyses should determine
how far a specific intervention contributed in changing the pre-existing
situation, i.e., whether the situation observed after the intervention is
different from the one we would have observed in its absence. We intend
to proceed along two paths: on the one hand, based on “selection on
observable assumptions”, we plan to combine matching techniques (to
balance the distribution of covariates among program beneficiaries and
not beneficiaries) with survival analysis techniques; on the other, we will
exploit “frailty” models to account for observations conditionally different
in terms of their hazards due to unobserved heterogeneity (Lancaster, 1979).
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5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we focussed on a local context (one Italian Province) for the
period 2011-2014, which follows the crisis and includes the Fornero reform.
The local perspective is both a limitation and a strength of our approach,
because of the focus on local government actors. We used individual
micro data coming from three different sources of administrative data.
The joint analysis of job transitions, ALMPs participation and EESI family
statements may provide a novel contribution to an integrated view of wel-
fare policies at the local level. Unfortunately, the quality of data collection
is not always befitting and strongly depends on the local institutions in
charge. The opportunity to access the actual and complete administrative
data would represent a valuable decision support tool for policy makers
and would allow scholars to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs
independently.
Our analysis traced job transitions to a steady position and investigated
how workers move across jobs, experiencing unemployment, program
participation, or different types of labor contracts. We used standard event
history analysis to model the time to exit to a steady job as a function of in-
dividual characteristics, previous labor experience and participation to pro-
grams. Results, although preliminary, highlights some interesting issues.
In particular, we found that people experimenting frequent contractual
changes or receiving advantages from a certain number of ALMPs actions
are in worse position in achieving the first stable position, suggesting a
dispersive path. These results are in line with previous literature stating
that frequent job interruptions can negatively affect subsequent working
life with fewer employment opportunities. Furthermore, we argued that
subjects involved in a high number of ALMPs actions may correspond to
less qualified human capital that remains caged inside PESs mechanism
for too long.
We aim to extend our analysis in several directions. As a first step, we
plan both to combinematching techniques (to balance the covariates distri-
bution among program beneficiaries and not-beneficiaries) with survival
analysis techniques, and exploit “frailty” models to account for observa-
tions conditionally different in terms of their hazards due to unobserved
heterogeneity.
220
Coli, Fabbri, Pacini, Sylos Labini
References
Anastasia B., Emireni G., Gambuzza M., Maschio S., Rasera M. (2016).
Grammatica delle comunicazioni obbligatorie /3, guida alle elaborazioni
a partire dai dati di flusso. Veneto Lavoro, Osservatorio & Ricerca.
Baldi C., De Blasio G., Di Bella G., Lucarelli A., Rizzi R. (2011). Turning the
compulsory communication data into a statistical system: preliminary
issues to set up an editing strategy. SIS Statistical Conference, Bologna.
BlossfeldH., GolschK., RohwerG.Eds. (2007).EventhistoryanalysiswithStata.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New York.
Bresciani P.G (2006). Servizi per l’impiego: modelli organizzativi. Quaderni
spin, Roma, Italia Lavoro.
Bruno C., Duflo E., Gurgand M., Rathelot M., Zamora F. (2013). Do Labor
Market Policies have Displacement Effects? Evidence from a Clustered
Randomized Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 531-580.
Caliendo M., Schmidl R. (2015). Youth Unemployment and Active Labor
Market Policies in Europe. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9488
Card, D., J. Kluve and A. Weber (2010). Active Labor Market Policy Evalua-
tions: AMeta Analysis. Economic Journal, 120 (548), 452- 477.
Card D., Kluve J., Weber A. (2015). What Works? AMeta Analysis of Recent
Active Labor Market Program Evaluations. IZA Discussion Paper No.
9236.
Caretta A., Fabrizi E., Mossucca R. (2013). Le dinamiche del mercato del la-
voro attraverso le transizioni multistato. Note tematiche No.1. Ministero
dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Dipartimento del Tesoro.
Chelli F., Gigliarano C. (2012). An Analysis of the Italian Labor Market
based on Compulsory Communications Data. Rivista di Statistica Ufficiale,
2-3/2012.
Cox D. R (1972). Regression Models and Life Tables (with Discussion).
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 34,187-220.
Cox D. R. (1975). Partial likelihood. Biometrika, 62, 269-276.
221
Active Labor Market Policies
Ham J, C., Lalonde R.J. (1996). The Effect of Sample Selection and Initial
Conditions in Duration Models: Evidence from Experimental Data on
Training. Econometrica, 64, 175–205.
Heckman J.J., Lalonde R.J. and Smith (1999). The Economics and Economet-
rics of Active LaborMarket Programs. Chapter 31 in O.C. Ashenfelter and
D. Card (ed.), The handbook of labor economics, 3(A), 1277-2097.
HollandP.W. (1986). Statistics and causal inference (withdiscussion). Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 81, pp. 945-970.
Imbens G.W. , Rubin D.B. (2015). Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and
Biomedical Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
IRPET (2014). Il sistema dei servizi per l’impiego in Toscana.
Lancaster T. (1979). Econometric methods for the duration of unemploy-
ment. Econometrica, 47, 939-956.
Mandrone, E. (2014). YouthGuarantee and the Italian PES: insights from IS-
FOL PLUS Survey data. CIMR ResearchWorking Paper Series, Working
Paper, No. 21.
Mandrone E., Radicchia D. (2011). La ricerca di lavoro: i canali di intermedi-
azione e i Centri per l’Impiego. Isfol Studi, No. 2.
Martin J. P. (2014). Activation and Active Labor Market Policies in OECD
Countries: Stylized Facts and Evidence onTheir Effectiveness. IZA Policy
Paper No. 84.
Ministero del lavoro e delle politiche sociali (2016). Il nuovo ISEE. Rapporto
di monitoraggio 2015. Quaderni della ricerca sociale, 37.
Reyneri E. (2005). Quando le organizzazioni sono chiamate a far fronte al
fallimento del mercato e delle reti sociali: il caso dei servizi per l’impiego.
Sociologia del lavoro, No. 100, Milano Franco Angeli.
Sestito P., Viviano E. (2016). Hiring incentives and/or firing cost reduction?
Evaluating the impact of the 2015 policies on the Italian labor market.
Questioni di economia e finanza. Occasional papers No. 325. Banca
d’Italia.
Sorcioni M. (2011). Il target giovani: una analisi per gruppi. Quaderni di
studi e statistiche sul mercato del lavoro, No. 3. I giovani e il lavoro
Ministero del lavoro e delle politiche sociali.
222
Coli, Fabbri, Pacini, Sylos Labini
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Number of hires and workers (2011-2014).
Year Hires Workers Turn-over
2011 71517 38728 1.8
2012 67692 36792 1.8
2013 59411 34103 1.7
2014 60008 34556 1.7
Whole period 258628 92655 2.8
Table 2: Number of ALMP interventions and beneficiaries (2011-2014).
Year ALMP Beneficiaries ALMP per person
2011 6569 4589 1.4
2012 14337 10251 1.4
2013 53506 34551 1.5
2014 54705 33731 1.6
Total 129117 61332 2.1
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Table 3: Hires by contractual type and gender, percentages (2011-2014).
Contract type Female% Male% Difference %
Apprenticeship 3.8 % 5.2% -1.4%
Projects Work 5.3% 5.6% -0.3%
Co.Co.Co.
Fixed term 57.1% 52.9% 4.2%
Open ended 18.5% 21.2% -2.8%
Others 15.3% 15.1% 0.2%
Total 100 % 100%
Table 4: Hires by contractual type and age, percentages (2011-2014).
Contract type Age
up to 29 30-49 50 and over Total (%) Total (Count)
Apprenticeship 13.7% 0.3% 0% 4.4% 11472
Projects Work 4.7% 5% 7.9% 5.4% 13956
Co.Co.Co.
Fixed term 45.3% 60.3% 57.5% 55.1% 142582
Open ended 14.7% 22.8% 19.9% 19.7% 51067
Others 21.6% 11.6% 14.7% 15.4% 39551
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 258628
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Table 9: Survivor functions at specific time points (months).
Time Survivor Confidence Interval
months function Lower Upper
1 0.948 0.947 0.950
2 0.908 0.906 0.909
3 0.903 0.901 0.905
6 0.886 0.884 0.888
12 0.854 0.852 0.856
24 0.769 0.766 0.772
36 0.701 0.697 0.704
Table 10: Cox regression model. CO-PES data.
Variable Hazard Ratio Robust Std. Errors p-value
Std. Errors
Age 1.006 0.001 0.000
Female 1.112 0.031 0.000
Fornero 0.805 0.047 0.000
N. Jobs 0.921 0.007 0.000
N. ALMPs 0.851 0.015 0.000
ALMP 1.369 0.101 0.000
Appr. 0.733 0.064 0.000
Fixed 1.285 0.049 0.000
Project 0.876 0.059 0.049
Training 1.047 0.261 0.853
High qualified 0.801 0.044 0.000
Low qualified 1.224 0.042 0.000
Log pseudo-lik Wald chi2(12) Prob> chi2
-50824.84 570.29 0.0000
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Table 11: Cox regression model. CO-PES-EESI data.
Variable Hazard Ratio Robust p-value
Std. Errors
Age 1.002 0.005 0.641
Female 1.303 0.165 0.037
Fornero 0.860 0.207 0.531
N. Jobs 0.930 0.027 0.012
N. ALMPs 0.862 0.063 0.042
ALMP 1.422 0.367 0.173
Appr. 0.542 0.221 0.134
Fixed 1.043 0.167 0.791
Project 0.710 0.223 0.276
Training 0.541 0.401 0.407
High qualified 0.635 0.183 0.115
Low qualified 0.763 0.129 0.109
EESI 0.767 0.079 0.010
Income 1.003 0.000 0.000
H. Size 0.945 0.040 0.185
Log pseudo-lik Wald chi2(15) Prob> chi2
-1793.3485 83.50 0.000
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Figure 1: Contractual Quality Index by gender.
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Figure 2: Contractual Quality Index by age group.
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Figure 3: Total hires.
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Figure 4: Share of permanent hires.
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Figure 5: Share of apprenticeship contracts on total young hires (29 or
younger).
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Figure 6: Number of young hires (29 or younger).
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